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INTRODUCTION
Public awareness of and concern about the incidence of autism
among children is growing. Autism is "now thought to be second only
to mental retardation among the most common serious developmen-
tal disabilities in the United States."' As public awareness has grown
and autism rates have risen, the provision of therapeutic services for
t B.S., B.A., University of Rochester, 2006;J.D., Cornell Law School, 2010; Note Edi-
tor, Cornell Law Review Volume 95. I wish to thank Professor Bernadette Meyler for her
guidance and encouragement while writing this Note. I am grateful to my colleagues on
the Cornell Law Review, whose suggestions have made this Note immeasurably better; I am
particularly indebted to Christine Lee, Jill McCormack, Lauren Gillespie, Patrick Wilson,
and Pooja Faldu, as well as to Sue Pado for her seemingly limitless supply of knowledge
and patience. Thanks are also due to Matthew Holland for his never-failing support, and
to my sister Kelly, who first inspired me to focus on the dignity of every human being.
I CraigJ. Newschaffer et al., The Epidemiology ofAutism Spectrum Disorders, 28 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 235, 236 (2007).
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children with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) 2 has become an ex-
tremely significant societal issue. As parents struggle to obtain the
often costly therapies that they believe represent their child's only
hope for a "normal" life, they have turned to both schools and insur-
ance companies for support, with mixed results. In response to lobby-
ing from parents and advocacy groups, many state legislatures have
passed statutes requiring private insurance companies to cover the
cost of applied behavioral analysis (ABA) for children with ASDs.3
Other parents have accessed ABA through their local schools via the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) ,4 which provides
that all disabled children receive a publicly supported education
suited to their needs. The struggle to obtain therapeutic services for
autistic children can be complicated, long, and frustrating; both the
insurance companies and the schools may have their own ideas about
what constitutes appropriate therapy, and those ideas do not necessa-
rily align. More importantly, however, the struggle simply to obtain
services may overshadow the larger issue of what services truly pro-
mote the best interests of the child.
A conceptual divide begins to emerge in considering therapeutic
services for children with ASDs. On the one hand, the schools pro-
vide such services, thereby giving them an educational quality. Insur-
ance companies eagerly endorse this educational conception, as it
would seemingly alleviate their responsibility to pay for such services.
On the other hand is the medical conception, supporters of which
posit that autism is a disease and that the therapeutic services are
treatments. Between these two conceptions lies a plethora of ques-
tions about the interactions between autistic individuals and society as
a whole.
Though it is perhaps not as well known, one can view autism and
societal interaction through another conception-the neurodiversity
conception. Autism, such advocates argue, is not a disorder but is sim-
2 Autism spectrum disorders include "[a]utistic disorder (also called 'classic' au-
tism)," "Asperger syndrome," and "Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Speci-
fied (or atypical autism)." Nat'l Inst. of Child Health & Human Dev., Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASDs), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/asd.cfm (last visited July 18,
2010).
3 See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1355.015 (Vernon 2009) (requiring a health benefit
plan to cover those treatments, including ABA, that a child's primary physician recom-
mends for a child between the age of two and six who is diagnosed with ASD); Mo. CODE
ANN., INS. § 15-835 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring insurers to cover habilitative services for
children under the age of nineteen who are diagnosed with ASD but excluding those
habilitative services provided through early intervention or school services).
4 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1501 (2006); Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 101 (a) (1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1103.
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ply an alternative wiring of the brain. 5 To summarize the philosophy
of the neurodiversity movement, Andrew Solomon quotes Jim Sin-
clair's seminal essay, Don't Mourn For Us:
It is not possible to separate the autism from the person. Therefore,
when parents say, "I wish my child did not have autism," what
they're really saying is, "I wish the autistic child I have did not exist,
and I had a different (non-autistic) child instead." Read that again.
This is what we hear when you mourn over our existence. This is
what we hear when you pray for a cure. This is what we know, when
you tell us of your fondest hopes and dreams for us: that your great-
est wish is that one day we will cease to be, and strangers you can
love will move in behind our faces. 6
The implications of this philosophy are clear and significant: autistics
(the preferred term amongst neurodiversity advocates for individuals
with ASDs) are not broken, and they do not require fixing. To advo-
cate otherwise is to advocate extermination.
Having identified these three ideological conceptions of autistic
individuals and societal interaction, two major questions remain: from
which of these perspectives should we approach deciding what ser-
vices are appropriate for children with ASDs, and how does our choice
of a perspective impact the manner in which we think such services
should be provided? In the discussion that follows, I attempt to an-
swer these questions. Throughout this discussion, I operate on two
basic assumptions: First, I assume that behavioral therapy benefits at
least some autistic people in some cases. Second, I assume that one
primary goal of a legal framework in this context is to respect and
enhance the dignity of the individual. One could, of course, disagree
with either or both of these assumptions, but I believe they are neces-
sary for a productive discussion. I also focus on the provision of ABA
rather than other therapies. My choice here stems from the two fol-
lowing realities: ABA has become an exceptionally popular therapy for
children with ASDs, and many state insurance provisions deal specifi-
cally with payments for this particular therapy.
Part I of this Note more fully introduces the conceptions of ASDs,
behavioral therapy, and society. In analyzing each, I focus on underly-
ing assumptions of each conception as well as potential objections to
each of them. Part II discusses the current law surrounding ASDs and
ABA, which will serve as a reference point for how the law might be
improved. Part III explores, through the lens of disability legal stud-
5 See Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights Movement, N.Y. MA., June 2, 2008, at 30, 32,
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/47225/ ("[Neurodiversity] activists argue
that autism is not an illness but an alternative way of being.").
6 Id. at 32 (quoting Jim Sinclair, Don't Mourn for Us, 1 OUR VOICE (Autism Network
Int'l, Syracuse, N.Y.) 1993, available at http://www.autreat.com/dontmourn.html).
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ies, which of the conceptions most fully integrates the best interests of
children with ASDs. After considering the benefits and shortcomings
of each conception, I conclude that none is fully satisfactory. Accord-
ingly, I propose a new conception that integrates the educational and
the neurodiversity models; I call this model the disability legal studies
model. Finally, I propose possible ways to change the law to reflect
the insights of this model.
I
EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPTIONS
A. The Medical Conception
The notion of understanding ASDs and ABA as disease and cure,
respectively, may be initially attractive, particularly if one is most inter-
ested in straightforward "solutions" to the "problem" of autism. The
legal field has increasingly been moving toward incorporating scien-
tific understanding-including the neurological advances that have
been growing by leaps and bounds in recent decades 7-into law. For
judges and school boards, a straightforward and "scientific" framing
may be simpler to apply. Also, a certain common sense appeal is in-
herent in being able to clearly state that ABA is a medical cure for
autism, as it could prevent insurance companies from denying thera-
pies that parents seek. Unsurprisingly, reality is not quite so neat.
Before evaluating the medical conception of ASDs and ABA, it is
necessary to understand at a basic level the meanings of those terms,
beginning with ASDs themselves. According to the National Institute
of Mental Health, children with ASDs exhibit impairments in "1) so-
cial interaction, 2) verbal and nonverbal communication, and 3) re-
petitive behaviors or interests." Furthermore, children with ASDs
may exhibit "unusual responses to sensory experiences."9 ASDs are
referred to as spectrum disorders because individuals may exhibit
highly variant levels of the associated traits. 10 Prevalence-rate esti-
7 LAURENCE R. TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALs
ABOUT MORALITY 1 (2005) ("Neuroscience advances during the past few decades have been
nothing short of astounding.").
8 NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS: PERVASIVE DEVELOP-
MENTAL DISORDERS 5 (2008), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/autism/
nimhautismspectrum.pdf; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (1) (i) (2009) ("Autism means a devel-
opmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal communication and social
interaction, generally evident before age three, that adversely affects a child's educational
performance. Other characteristics often associated with autism are engagement in repeti-
tive activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to environmental change or change
in daily routines, and unusual responses to sensory experiences.").
9 NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 8, at 5.
10 See id. ("Each of these symptoms runs the gamut from mild to severe. They will
present in each individual child differently."). This Note will address these differences in
the context of evaluating the shortcomings of various conceptions of ASDs and ABA.
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mates for ASDs range from two to six per one thousand children,11
and according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), in 2007, 258,305 children ages six through twenty-one and
39,434 children ages three through five were "served under the 'au-
tism' classification for special education services." 12
Within the last few decades, ABA has generally become the most
favored therapy for children with ASDs. ABA is "the process of apply-
ing sometimes tentative principles of behavior to the improvement of
specific behaviors, and simultaneously evaluating whether or not any
changes noted are indeed attributable to the process of application-
and if so, to what parts of that process."13 Although the therapy was
developed as early as the 1960s, Dr. 0. Ivar Lovaas is widely credited
with having pioneered the use of ABA to treat children with ASDs. 14
In 1987, he published a paper showing significantly improved educa-
tional outcomes for children with ASDs who were treated with ABA as
compared to untreated control groups.1 5 Critics alleged a number of
flaws in this study, 16 but it has since been replicated.' 7 Many consider
ABA the most effective therapy for children with ASDs; the fact that
parents are pushing to have insurance cover this therapy reflects this
consideration. 18
The scientific understanding of ASDs is, as virtually all those in
the neuroscience field would recognize, convoluted and incomplete. 19
11 Id. at3.
12 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Autism Spectrum Disorders, http://
www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/topics.html (last visited July 18, 2010).
13 Donald M. Baer et al., Some Current Dimensions of Applied Behavioral Analysis, I J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 91, 91 (1968) (footnote omitted).
14 See, e.g., Susan Faja & Geraldine Dawson, Early Intervention for Autism, in HANDBOOK
OF PRESCHOOL MENTAL HEALTH: DEVELOPMENT, DISORDERS, AND TREATMENT 388, 390, 393
(Joan L. Luby ed., 2006) ("The work of Lovaas and colleagues ... was groundbreaking in
its comprehensive exploration of intervention with autism.").
15 0. Ivar Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Function-
ing in Young Autistic Children, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (1987).
16 See, e.g., Faja & Dawson, supra note 14, at 393-94.
17 See Glen 0. Sallows & Tamlynn D. Graupner, Intensive Behavioral Treatment for Chil-
dren with Autism: Four-Year Outcome and Predictors, 110 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 417,
419 (2005).
18 See Larry Abramson, Family Wins Suit for Autistic Son's Health Care, NAT'L PUB. RADIO,
Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=14577821.
19 Nat'l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, Autism Fact Sheet, http://
www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/autism/detailautism.htm [hereinafter Autism Fact Sheet]
(last visited July 18, 2010):
Scientists aren't certain about what causes ASD, but it's likely that both ge-
netics and environment play a role. Researchers have identified a number
of genes associated with the disorder. Studies of people with ASD have
found irregularities in several regions of the brain. Other studies suggest
that people with ASD have abnormal levels of serotonin or other neuro-
transmitters in the brain. These abnormalities suggest that ASD could re-
sult from the disruption of normal brain development early in fetal
development caused by defects in genes that control brain growth and that
2010] 1257
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As evidenced by the ongoing debate over the effects of vaccination on
autism rates, 20 no consensus exists about the underlying causes of
ASDs. Some believe that the recent explosion of autism rates is attrib-
utable to environmental factors; others believe that autism is a genetic
phenomenon. Neurodiversity proponents believe that autism is ge-
netic but object to attempts to cure it through genomic
manipulation.2'
The underlying uncertainties about the causes of autism pose a
significant obstacle for proponents of the medical conception. First, it
is exceedingly difficult for doctors to offer an accurate and conclusive
diagnosis of autism. The American Academy of Pediatrics has articu-
lated the difficulty, noting that
[e]arly diagnosis of ASD is challenging in the context of primary
care visits, because there is no pathognomonic sign or laboratory
test to detect it. Thus, the physician must make the diagnosis on
the basis of the presence or absence of a constellation of symptoms.
ASD is a phenomenologic rather than an etiologic disor-
der . . . , making the diagnosis more challenging. Pediatricians
must rely on parent report, clinical judgment, and the ability to rec-
ognize criteria-based behaviors that define ASD. 2 2
This difficulty for doctors contributes to trouble in identifying appro-
priate treatment and obtaining insurance coverage thereafter. Insur-
ance companies have seized upon the uncertainty surrounding autism
and its treatment, refusing to cover ABA and other therapies (includ-
ing occupational therapy) because they deem such treatments
"experimental."23
The medical conception would solve such difficulties by requiring
insurance companies to cover what the powerful advocacy group Au-
tism Speaks describes as "the most effective forms of treatment
regulate how brain cells communicate with each other, possibly due to the
influence of environmental factors on gene function. While these findings
are intriguing, they are preliminary and require further study.
20 This controversy is, again, outside the scope of this Note.
21 See Solomon, supra note 5, at 33 ("There are in reality three sides in this debate:
those who believe autism is caused by environmental toxins (especially vaccines) and
should be cured by addressing those pollutants; those who believe it is genetic and should
be addressed through the genome; and the neurodiverse, who believe that it is genetic and
should be left alone. These camps are blatandy hostile to one another.").
22 Comm. on Children with Disabilities, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Pediatrician's Role
in the Diagnosis and Management ofAutistic Spectrum Disorder in Children, 107 PEDIATRICS 1221,
1221 (2001).
23 See Micheletti v. State Health Benefits Comm'n, 913 A.2d 842, 845-46 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2007); NPR Radio Broadcast, supra note 18 ("Many insurance companies say
they will not cover ABA because they view it as experimental and unproven.").
[Vol. 95:12531258
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[with] . . . the best outcomes" for ASDs. 24 Despite what insurance
companies may claim, advocates argue that these mandates would re-
sult in very little additional cost to policyholders. 25 As such, advocates
see little downside and a significant upside to such mandates.
B. The Educational Conception
The educational conception can perhaps be seen as a more care-
ful version of the medical conception. Its proponents do not quibble
with the classification of autism as a disorder, nor do they claim that
ameliorating the outward manifestations of autism is an illegitimate
goal. Rather, they propose that because science, as of yet, has been
unable to positively identify the concrete cause or causes of autism
(not to mention the underlying mechanisms by which it affects its
manifestations), it is premature to consider ABA a "cure. ' 26 Instead,
ABA should be viewed as a therapy that may help children achieve
academically, like speech-language pathology and occupational ther-
apy. Speech-language pathology is a particularly apt analogy for ABA
because it is one of the many therapies that may be incorporated into
an ABA program. 27
One concern that many have about ABA is its cost. ABA can be
extremely expensive, thereby limiting the ability of some families to
access the therapy.28 Cost concerns may affect school districts as well.
In 2002, public schools provided services for almost 120,000 children
with ASDs.2 9 This number represents a large increase from 1993,
when public schools served fewer than 20,000 children with ASDs.
30
24 Press Release, Autism Speaks, Autism Speaks Announces Multi-State Insurance Leg-
islation Campaign (Dec. 27, 2007) (available at http://www.autismspeaks.org/press/
insurancejlegislation-campaign.php).
25 AUTISM SPEAKS, ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF AUTISM-
RELATED SERVICES 15 (2007), http://www.autismspeaks.org/docs/arguments-for-private-
insurance-coverage.pdf (noting that in a survey of ten states that have mandates for insur-
ance coverage of behavioral therapy, the estimated cost increase was less than one
percent).
26 See Abramson, supra note 18 ("Pamela Greenberg of the Association for Behavioral
Health and Wellness says there just is not enough data on the effectiveness of ABA therapy.
'Yes, there are examples of where ABA has been very effective. And there are other exam-
ples of situations where it has been very harmful,' Greenberg says.").
27 See Mark R. Hammond, Applied Behavior Analysis in Speech-Language Therapy, Sci. AU-
TISM TREATMENT (Ass'n for Sci. Autism Treatment, Crosswicks, N.J.), Spring 2000, at 5, 6,
http://www.asatonline.org/forum/articles/speech-language-therapy.htm (noting that
"there can be an almost symbiotic relationship between speech therapy and applied behav-
ior analysis").
28 See Rachel Ratcliff Womack, Autism and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Are Autistic Children Receiving Appropriate Treatment in Our Schools?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 189,
191 (2002) (estimating the cost to be between $12,000 and $20,000 per year for-the Lovaas
ABA method).
29 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: CHILDREN WITH AUTISM 17
(2005).
30 Id.
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Providing services to children with ASDs may come with a stiff price
tag: in 1999-2000, school districts spent over $18,500 on each autistic
pupil. By contrast, a regular-education pupil cost the school district
around $6,500.31 Thus, when discussing the optimal arrangement for
the provision of ABA to children with ASDs, one must always keep in
mind the cost of the therapy.
The issue of cost also becomes important when deciding if ABA
falls within the coverage of the IDEA, which requires that participat-
ing states-currently all fifty-provide children with certain disabili-
ties, including ASDs, a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE).32
As part of FAPE, school districts must provide for "related services,"
which the IDEA defines as "transportation, and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be required to
assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." 33 Be-
cause the IDEA covers all children with recognized disabilities, its
reach will necessarily be broader than insurance laws, which by defini-
tion only provide for those children who have insurance coverage.
As the IDEA becomes the preferred mechanism to cover the costs
of therapies for children with ASDs, the educational conception nec-
essarily implicates ABA. This proposal somewhat contradicts the no-
tion of ABA as a medical treatment because the IDEA specifically
excludes coverage for medical services (except to the extent that such
services are necessary for diagnosis or evaluation). 34 However, the
definition of "medical services" in the context of the IDEA is very nar-
row-the term refers only to those services "provided by a licensed
physician. ' 35 Because nobody, including proponents of the medical
conception, argues that ABA needs to be performed by a licensed phy-
sician, the two conceptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
31 Id. at 27.
32 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006) (defining FAPE as "special education and related
services that-(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C)
include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in
the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program required under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)]"); see also id. § 1412(a) (1) (A) (including as
one of the requirements for participating states that "[a] free appropriate public education
is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and
21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled
from school"). The IDEA first recognized autism as a covered disability in 1990. Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 101 (a)(1), 104
Stat. 1103, 1103 (defining children with disabilities).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (A).
34 Id.
35 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5) (2009). This regulation encompasses psychiatric services
but does not include psychological services. See Darlene L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 568 F.
Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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The IDEA requires that "related services" be provided for chil-
dren with disabilities if those services are "required to assist a child
with a disability to benefit from special education."3 6 The IDEA spe-
cifically identifies a number of services that may be considered related
services, including
speech-language pathology and audiology services, interpreting ser-
vices, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, rec-
reation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services,
school nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to
receive a free appropriate public education as described in the indi-
vidualized education program of the child, [and] counseling ser-
vices, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility
services. 3 7
Notably, behavioral therapy does not appear in this list. However, a
number of cases exist in which an individualized education program
(IEP)-the document that sets forth the program for an individual
student's FAPE 3 8-has included some form of behavioral therapy. 39
The educational conception, then, argues that schools should
provide ABA to children with ASDs who require it to reap the benefits
of the education to which they are entitled. This position is somewhat
complicated, however, by the fact that the IDEA does not require that
children with disabilities be provided with the services they need to
achieve their maximum potential; instead, it ensures that disabled
children be provided with a "basic floor of opportunity. '40 Further-
more, states and school districts may consider economics in deciding
what constitutes that floor. The Fourth Circuit has explained that
"Congress intended the states to balance the competing interests of
economic necessity, on the one hand, and the special needs of a hand-
icapped child, on the other, when making education placement deci-
sions."41 A state, the court said, is not required to disregard costs in
deciding what constitutes a FAPE: "Although . . . [the school board]
should not make placement decisions on the basis of financial consid-
36 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a).
37 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).
38 See id. § 1414(d) (1) (A) (i) (describing the required content of an IEP).
39 See, e.g., County Sch. Bd. v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2005); L.B. ex rel.
KB. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 2004); Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Sch.
Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing a Lovaas model of ABA).
40 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982). This seminal Supreme Court case
introduced the language "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits," a test that lower courts have adopted to gauge whether a school district complies
with the IDEA. See id. at 207; infra note 98 (citing lower-court cases applying the Rowley
test).
41 Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991).
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erations alone, 'appropriate' does not mean the best possible educa-
tion that a school could provide if given access to unlimited funds. 42
This struggle to weigh the costs and benefits of a given program
for the disabled is not unique to the educational context. Now-Judge
Robert Katzmann has touched on this issue in the context of transpor-
tation law and the disabled, noting that where an issue is cast as one of
"rights," it takes the debate to a more sensitive place than a simple
discussion of costs and benefits. 43 This observation certainly resonates
in the educational context, where parents most assuredly view the is-
sues as involving rights. The ability of school districts to perform cost-
benefit analyses in determining what therapies to provide may then
raise significant doubts as to whether the educational conception can,
on its own, provide access to therapy for all children with ASDs who
might reasonably benefit from ABA.
To further understand the meaning of the educational concep-
tion, it is necessary to ask what, precisely, is meant by "educational."
This task is difficult because although education is often identified as
a critical human right, it is not often defined. For example, the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires
that signatories provide free education to their citizens, but it does not
define education beyond requiring that
education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.... [E]ducation
shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society,
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all na-
tions and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activ-
ities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.4 4
These are lofty and admirable goals, and they illustrate the important
role that education can play in cultural understanding; the Covenant,
however, explains neither what education is nor how it will achieve
these goals.
The IDEA also utilizes the term "education" without offering a
definition; the federal regulations relevant to the IDEA likewise pro-
vide no definition. 45 The regulations do, however, define "special ed-
ucation." 46 That definition is helpful in exploring what advocates of
the educational conception may mean when they contemplate educa-
tional benefits. For example, special education is defined to include
42 Id.
43 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION
POLICY FOR THE DISABLED 74-75 (1986).
44 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
45 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.4-.45 (2009).
46 Id. § 300.39.
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"[t] ravel training," which is instruction that allows children with disa-
bilities to "[d] evelop an awareness of the environment in which they
live" and "[1] earn the skills necessary to move effectively and safely
from place to place within that environment (e.g., in school, in the
home, at work, and in the community) .47
This definition suggests that educational benefits primarily seek
to allow the disabled child to adapt to society. The regulations further
illustrate this idea through the definition of physical education as the
development of "(A) [p]hysical and motor fitness; (B) [flundamental
motor skills and patterns; and (C) [s]kills in aquatics, dance, and indi-
vidual and group games and sports (including intramural and lifetime
sports) .,"48 Although this definition does not explicitly embrace societal
norms, the norm-based focus becomes clearer when one considers
that the regulations identify dance (presumably in the form of organ-
ized dance), games, and sports as equally important as
"[flundamental motor skills and patterns. '49 The IDEA's notion of
education, then, is perhaps best understood as training that will best
enable a child with disabilities to integrate into the dominant society.
C. The Neurodiversity Conception
The neurodiversity conception stands for the proposition that it
is impossible to separate the individual from the autism; autism is sim-
ply an intrinsic and equally acceptable way of being. This idea is
clearly incompatible with the medical conception of autism as a dis-
ease and ABA as a cure. Furthermore, even if ABA did "cure" autism,
neurodiversity advocates would reject it because they would see it as
displacing the original, autistic self. The educational conception, on
the other hand, is perhaps less axiomatically incompatible with the
neurodiversity conception because, although it views autism as an ob-
stacle to be overcome, it at least does not suggest that autism can be
cured.
The neurodiversity movement counts amongst its members both
parents of autistic children and individuals who themselves have
ASDs,50 and it is an attractive movement in many ways. First, the
movement offers hope in the present, not at some elusive point in the
future when a "cure" can be found. Second, it offers an opportunity
to listen to the voices of those who have ASDs-a group that other
forms of autism advocacy often silences. There is arguably, however, a
47 Id. § 300.39(b) (4).
48 Id. § 300.39(b) (2) (i).
49 Id. § 300.39(b) (2) (i) (B).
50 See Solomon, supra note 5, at 33 ("The neurodiversity activists include both people
on the spectrum and their parents; their opponents likewise include both groups, with a
heavy concentration of parents.").
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downside to the movement. Although neurodiversity proponents
claim to eschew labels such as high- and low-functioning autism,51 it is
clear that only those who have the ability to communicate (be it
through speech or some other form of aided communication, such as
a computer) and organize are able to become neurodiversity advo-
cates. Those who are more severely autistic do not have that opportu-
nity, and this observation may lead some to question the ability of the
neurodiversity movement to speak for those whom the movement pur-
ports to serve. As one neurodiversity advocate has observed, "When
you know a person on the spectrum, you know one person on the spec-
trum."52 Although neurodiversity advocates often utilize this expres-
sion in support of their position, it also cuts the other way; the fact
that one person is on the spectrum may not qualify him or her to
speak for all persons on the spectrum.
The neurodiversity conception is easier to articulate than to fully
understand. Some in the autism advocacy community have harshly
criticized this conception. 53 This level of distaste is hard to under-
stand, although the simplest explanation may be that parents of se-
verely autistic children, already faced with many difficulties, cling to
the idea that a cure may exist that will ease the suffering they believe
their children will experience. The hardships parents see in their
children's futures may sadden them, or the parents may be in some-
thing of a state of mourning for the expected parent-child relation-
ship that they believe they will no longer experience. 54 Perhaps, then,
parents who are experiencing profound grief over a lost relationship
are hostile to the suggestion that the relationship is indeed lost
forever.
Another possible reason for the resistance to the neurodiversity
movement is that our society is in many ways based on norms, loosely
defined as "rules of behavior that are enforced not by courts but by
51 See NPR Radio Broadcast: Autism Movement Seeks Acceptance, Not Cures (June
26, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/tran-
script.php?storyd=5488463) (quoting a neurodiversity advocate as saying "I don't believe
in functioning levels. High functioning and low and all of that crud, that is really mostly
illusions in people's heads.").
52 Solomon, supra note 5, at 34 (emphasis added).
53 Id. ("'Please don't write about them,' Lenny Schafer, editor of the prominent Scha-
fer Autism Report, adoptive father of a severely autistic child, and a vaccine activist, said.
'It's a handful of noisy people who get a lot of media attention but do not represent a
broad swath of the autism community. Best for them to be ignored. They want to redefine
autism as something nice that Einstein and Bill Gates had. They're trivializing what autism
really is. It's like stealing money from the tin cup of a blind man when you say that it's not
an illness.' . . . John Best, parent of a child with autism and author of the Hating Autism
blog, puts it most harshly: 'It's time to put an end to celebrating having brain damage."').
54 See Sinclair, supra note 6.
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other forces."5 5 Society enforces these norms because those that do
not follow them are subject to punishment from bystanders. 56 Some
scholars argue that these norms are intended to promote efficient be-
haviors and are therefore generally positive.5 7 Autistics, almost by def-
inition, do not typically express a high level of conformity with social
norms. For many people, this lack of social compliance goes against
everything they have been socialized to believe is necessary for society
to function.
Despite the hostility, if one embraces the neurodiversity concep-
tion, it becomes clear that the imposition of ABA significantly impli-
cates civil rights. On a very broad level, civil rights are "the general
category of basic rights needed for free and equal citizenship.
58
These rights can be viewed through the prism of the right to be free
from discrimination. 59 Proponents of the neurodiversity conception
often vehemently oppose the notion that behavioral therapy is appro-
priate for any autistic individual, much less for everyone with ASDs.60
This opposition is logical if one considers it discrimination to force
individuals to conform to social norms that do not speak to their own
needs. As I will discuss in Part II, this conformity is largely what the
current law seeks to achieve.
II
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
This Part will begin by considering how the IDEA, as a represen-
tative statute of the educational conception, encompasses the provi-
sion of ABA for autistic children. It will assess both the statutory
language of the IDEA and the courts' interpretation of that language.
55 Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS AND THE LAW
13, 28 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (providing examples of social norms, such as the under-
standing that one should wear shoes in an office or ask permission before smoking in
another person's house).
56 See id. at 31.
57 Id. at 30.
58 Andrew Altman, Civil Rights, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.1 (rev.
ed. 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-rights/.
59 See id. § 3 ("In liberal democracies, civil rights claims are typically conceptualized in
terms of the idea of discrimination." (citation omitted)).
60 See, e.g., Andrew Fenton & Tim Krahn, Autism, Neurodiversity and Equality Beyond the
"Normal, "J. ETHICS MENTAL HEALTH, Nov. 2007, at 1, 4 ("[I]t is not acceptable to expect
that an autistic individual undergo behavioral therapy that teaches them to suppress vari-
ous physical or verbal ticks. An important criterion for whether they undergo treatment is
whether it is in their interests, understood as a recognizable interest from their perspec-
tive .... "); Solomon, supra note 5, at 108 ("Many neurodiversity people also take exception
to ABA. Camille Clark, who blogs as the Autism Diva, told me that she objected to the
treatment's goal, to render the autistic child 'indistinguishable from his peers.' ABA, she
says, 'may make a very neurotic simulacrum of a normal kid who can pull off a normal act
in some narrow situations, but there is no way to train a kid to be "normal" inside using
dog/dolphin/pigeon training methods."').
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It will then consider the coverage provided by state insurance statutes
as representative of the medical conception.
A. ABA Is a Related Service Within the Meaning of the IDEA
The IDEA defines "related services" and mandates that a child's
special education include them.61 By comparing ABA to two of the
explicitly identified related services, namely speech pathology and oc-
cupational therapy, one can see that ABA is similar enough that the
IDEA ought to-and does-cover its use in appropriate cases.
ABA is built on the notion that, through repetition and careful
training methods, therapists can train individuals with ASDs to either
implement or eliminate selected behaviors. 62 ABA must be carefully
designed to meet the needs of the individual child receiving the ther-
apy; this tailoring is inherent, as therapists target specific behaviors
that they identify through personalized evaluation. ABA practitioners
may use a variety of methods in implementing the therapy.
One common method used by practitioners is discrete trial train-
ing (DTT), "a method of instruction in which tasks are broken down
into small subtasks, instruction is given on each individual subtask,
and positive reinforcement is given for correct answers. DTT entails
frequent repetition of drills set up in a programmed sequence." 63 An-
other representative therapy consists of
employing brief, standard instructions and tasks requiring only vis-
ual attending (e.g., matching), using familiar materi-
als .... prompting success (physically assisting him or her to place a
ring on the pole if a demonstration was not sufficient), presenting
only two or three trials at a time, and reinforcing each response
immediately with powerful reinforcers .... 64
By considering these two example therapies, one can conclude that a
representative ABA method involves multiple trials of simple tasks
where the therapist positively reinforces a successful outcome and
gives physical assistance, if necessary.
The methods used by speech pathologists and occupational ther-
apists resemble those of ABA therapists. Speech pathologists utilize a
variety of techniques depending on the particular outcome they seek.
These outcomes may include "reduc[ing] overall speaking rate," im-
61 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (A) (2006); id. § 1401(26) (A).
62 See Baer et al., supra note 13, at 92 (discussing the seven features that are essential
to ABA).
63 J.P. v. W. Clark Cmty. Sch., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (internal
citations omitted). The court goes on, however, to note that some experts have reserva-
tions regarding the efficacy of the discrete trial method; these reservations may include the
"concern that children trained solely by the discrete trial format tend not to generalize
very well and tend not to retain their skills well." Id. at 929.
64 Sallows & Graupner, supra note 17, at 422.
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proving "overall speech performance," and focusing on interactions
between those with speech disabilities and listeners.65 Speech-lan-
guage pathologists choose an appropriate goal for each client by con-
sulting with the client and with individuals close to the client and then
by identifying primary and secondary deficits. 66 After the pathologist
identifies relevant deficits and chooses an appropriate goal, the
pathologist might use any of the following techniques: multiple read-
ings of word lists, 6 7 modeling particular ways of using the organs or
artificial organs of language production, 68 and providing positive rein-
forcement for successful attempts at appropriate speech production. 69
Occupational therapists begin their assessments in a manner simi-
lar to speech-language pathologists: "An assessment ... should always
be led by the needs of the person rather than by the resources availa-
ble .... Identification of the individual's needs provides the founda-
tion for proposing solutions. '70 After identifying the needs of the
individual client, an occupational therapist then considers, with the
client, possible solutions to those particular problems.7' The occupa-
tional therapist then implements the chosen solutions. For example,
where the client has trouble standing up, the occupational therapist
might provide physical assistance in performing the motions. 72 Verbal
prompts and encouragement may also be part of an occupational
therapy regimen. 73 The goal, therefore, of occupational therapy is to
allow the client to perform the necessary activities of living with
greater ease.
After looking at these three types of therapies-ABA, speech-lan-
guage pathology, and occupational therapy-some key similarities
emerge. First, each therapy focuses on the needs of the individual
client, and each therapy is tailored to meet those particular needs.
65 David R. Beukelman et al., Outcomes Measurement in Motor Speech Disorders, in MEA-
SURING OUTCOMES IN SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 334, 335-36 (Carol M. Frattali ed.,
1998).
66 Keith Landis et al., THE SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY TREATMENT PLANNER 3-4
(2004) (describing a six-step process to develop an effective treatment plan). "[S]peech-
language pathologists must focus the treatment process on the most significant
problems.... It is important to consider the opinions of clients (as appropriate, depend-
ing on the client's age and mental status) and significant others to prioritize communica-
tive issues and other related disabilities." Id.
67 Id. at 10-11.
68 Id. at 23-24.
69 Id. at 30.
70 Cath Doman, Management of the Environment, in OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY AND PHYSI-
CAL DYSFUNCTION: PRINCIPLES, SKILLS AND PRACTICE 168, 170 (Annie Turner et al. eds., 5th
ed., Harcourt Publishers Ltd. 2002) (1981).
71 See id.
72 Liz Tipping, Moving and Handling, in OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY AND PHYSICAL DYS-
FUNCTION: PRINCIPLES, SKILLS AND PRACTICE, supra note 70, at 181, 181, 185-87 (noting,
however, that "where possible, the overall aim should be for [the client's] independence").
73 See id. at 181.
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Second, positive reinforcement plays a role in each therapy. Third,
the therapist performing each therapy may actively assist and model
behavior for the client. Fourth, a trained therapist-not a medical
doctor-performs each therapy. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly,
each therapy is an intensive, one-on-one method to help a client de-
velop appropriate and necessary skills. Children with autism may
often benefit from speech-language pathology and occupational ther-
apy as well as ABA.7 4 The similarities between ABA and these two re-
lated services strongly suggest that ABA also should be explicitly
included as a "related service" under the IDEA. 75
B. Court Interpretations of the IDEA and Its Relationship to
ABA
A few courts have specifically dealt with cases involving the IDEA
and ABA. These cases generally indicate that ABA can, in appropriate
cases, be part of an individual FAPE. Examining the reasoning and
discussion in these cases provides additional evidence that ABA
should be considered a "related service" pursuant to the IDEA.76
There are no Supreme Court cases on point; however, a number of
circuit courts of appeals have addressed ABA in conjunction with the
IDEA.
In G v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schools,77 the Fourth Circuit dealt with
the implementation of a FAPE and the development of an IEP. G was
a child with autism for whom the school district first developed an IEP
in 1994.78 His parents became dissatisfied with his progress, and in
1996 they requested that the school district add Lovaas-style ABA to
G's IEP. When the school district refused to honor this request, G's
parents sought out private therapy.79 In 1997, the school district de-
veloped an IEP that included all the aspects of the Lovaas method
except for the participation of a Lovaas-certified consultant. The
Fourth Circuit ultimately held that it could not, on the record before
it, determine whether the 1997 IEP, which excluded the assistance of
the Lovaas-certified consultant, would satisfy the relevant standard of
a plan "'reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit' to G."80
Notably, however, the court did not suggest that the 1997 IEP improp-
erly included the Lovaas method, nor did the school district explicitly
74 See, e.g., Autism Speaks, Your Child's Rights, http://www.autismspeaks.org/rights/
index.php (last visited July 18, 2010) (listing ABA, speech pathology, and occupational
therapy as interventions for children with autism).
75 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a) (2009).
76 Id.
77 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003).
78 Id. at 299.
79 Id. at 300.
80 Id. at 307-08.
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dispute the necessity of its inclusion.81 The court also left open the
possibility of G's parents being compensated for their expenditures
on private ABA therapy.8 2 This case, therefore, indicates that for
some autistic children, Lovaas-method ABA may be an acceptable-
and perhaps critical-part of the IEP.
The Third Circuit also considered at least one IDEA case involv-
ing ABA therapy. In an unpublished decision, that court considered
the award of attorneys' fees in a case that involved whether a school
board could reduce a child's ABA therapy from twelve hours per week
to six.8s In this case, the court did not consider the permissible
amount of ABA therapy provided because an administrative law judge
already had determined that the school could not reduce the hours of
ABA therapy.8 4 The issue before the Third Circuit instead dealt with
an award of attorneys' fees, which the IDEA provides may be available
to prevailing parties.8 5 Although this case is somewhat attenuated, it
provides further evidence that the IDEA may implicitly require ABA
for those children who would benefit from the therapy.
One* particularly significant case arose in the Sixth Circuit. In
Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education,8 6 the court held that a
school district refusing even to consider providing ABA to an autistic
student, when the school did not take into account his particular edu-
cational needs, constituted a procedural violation of the IDEA.8 7
Zachary Deal was an autistic child whose parents had implemented
ABA therapy in the home, completely outside the school context.88
According to the court, "[a] t a May 24, 1999, IEP meeting, [Zachary's
parents] requested... 43 hours per week of one-on-one ABA therapy
and 5 hours per week of speech therapy. The IEP team determined
that it could not document any regression Zachary would suffer ....
so the School System declined [to offer services]."89 The court went
on to state:
The evidence reveals that the School System, and its representatives,
had pre-decided not to offer Zachary intensive ABA services regard-
less of any evidence concerning Zachary's individual needs and the
effectiveness of his private program. This predetermination
amounted to a procedural violation of the IDEA. Because it effec-
tively deprived Zachary's parents of meaningful participation in the
81 See id. at 306-08.
82 See id. at 308-09.
83 A.S. v. Colts Neck Bd. of Educ., 190 F. App'x 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2006).
84 See id. at 142.
85 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (2006); A.S., 190 F. App'x at 142.
86 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).
87 See id. at 857.
88 Id. at 845.
89 Id. at 846.
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IEP process, the predetermination caused substantive harm and
therefore deprived Zachary of a FAPE.90
The concept of a prohibition on predetermination-that is, de-
ciding a child's placement based on factors other than that child's
individual needs-is important in the IDEA context. At least in part,
the regulations that require a school district to base placement deci-
sions on the child's IEP form the basis for this prohibition on prede-
termination. 9 1 For proponents of ABA, it is a helpful doctrine
because, at least in the Sixth Circuit, school districts may not simply
disregard ABA therapy as a matter of course.
A few other cases have arisen in which a child's FAPE included
ABA.92 Taken together, these cases seem to indicate that (1) school
districts, in at least some cases, include ABA as part of a child's FAPE;
and (2) in cases where ABA is not included in a child's FAPE, the
judiciary has, on at least some occasions, required the school district
to include it. This evidence strongly suggests that ABA is a "related
service" under the IDEA.93
C. Limitations on the IDEA's Provision of Services to Children
with ASDs
The IDEA, although it sometimes covers provision of ABA, does not
offer a complete solution to the problem of accessing the therapy.
The primary reason for this defect is that the IDEA does not require
school districts to provide disabled children with the tools to achieve
their maximum level of personal accomplishment. Instead, the IDEA
simply requires that students be provided with enough to achieve a
minimum level of accomplishment. The seminal Supreme Court case
Board of Education v. Rowley94 elucidated this proposition, and it re-
mains controlling precedent. In Rowley, the Court elaborated on the
standard for evaluating an IEP for compliance with the IDEA:
Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child with a
"free appropriate public education," we hold that it satisfies this re-
quirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient sup-
port services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction .... In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personal-
ized instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in the
regular classrooms of the public education system, should be rea-
90 Id. at 857.
91 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b) (2) (2009).
92 See, e.g., County Sch. Bd. v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2005); L.B. ex rel.
KB. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 2004); Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Sch.
Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2004).
93 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a).
94 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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sonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and
advance from grade to grade. 95
Rowley also introduced the phrase "basic floor of opportunity" as
it applies to the IDEA. 96 In other words, this case establishes that
school districts are only required to provide as much as is necessary
for a child to pass but not as much as is necessary for a child to excel.
The Rowley Court established the test for determining compliance
with the IDEA:
[A] court's inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e) (2) is twofold.
First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the
Act? And second, is the individualized educational program devel-
oped through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are
met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Con-
gress and the courts can require no more.9
7
As a result, a number of lower courts have adopted the test for IDEA
compliance that an IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits." 98
The IDEA is further unable to provide ABA access to all children
who would benefit from it because some courts have held that school
districts are entitled to take economic considerations into account
when deciding what constitutes a FAPE. 9 9 This limitation on the
IDEA is critical because it could provide a reason for school districts to
refuse ABA access to children with ASDs.
D. State Insurance Statute Coverage
In this subpart, I will consider several representative state insur-
ance statutes and their coverage relative to the IDEA. The three stat-
utes illustrate the diverse approaches among states and the variations
in the amount of coverage these states have required insurance com-
panies to provide for ABA.
The first law I will consider is the Pennsylvania provision requir-
ing insurance companies to provide for ABA.' 00 This law provides, in
pertinent part, that "[a] health insurance policy or government pro-
gram . . . shall provide to covered individuals or recipients under
twenty-one (21) years of age coverage for the diagnostic assessment of
autism spectrum disorders and for the treatment of autism spectrum
95 Id. at 203-04.
96 Id. at 200.
97 Id. at 206-07 (footnotes omitted).
98 See, e.g., D.F. ex rel. N.F. v, Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595, 598 (2d Cir.
2005); Petersen v. Hastings Pub. Sch., 31 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1994).
99 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
100 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 764h (West Supp. 2009).
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disorders." 10 1 The law additionally defines treatment of ASDs as in-
cluding rehabilitative care, which the statute defines as "professional
services and treatment programs, including applied behavioral analy-
sis, provided by an autism service provider to produce socially signifi-
cant improvements in human behavior or to prevent loss of attained
skill or function."'10 2 A significant difference in this coverage and the
coverage of the IDEA is immediately noticeable: the IDEA standard
ensures a "basic floor of opportunity,"10 3 while the Pennsylvania stat-
ute strives "to produce socially significant improvements in human
behavior."104
Looking next to the Texas law, one finds a much less detailed
statute. The Texas law simply provides that "[a] t a minimum, a health
benefit plan must provide coverage.. . to an enrollee older than two
years of age and younger than six years of age who is diagnosed with
autism spectrum disorder" and mandates coverage of all generally rec-
ognized services prescribed therein. 10 5 The Texas law then specifi-
cally includes ABA as a generally recognized service. 10 6 This statute
may actually provide less coverage than the IDEA, however, because it
only requires coverage up to age six; the IDEA requires coverage
throughout the entire school career. Comparison of the requisite
levels of coverage is difficult because the Texas statute provides so lit-
tle detail. Thus, at least one state statute does not necessarily improve
upon the coverage available through the IDEA, but it remains to be
seen whether interpretation of this statute may provide more coverage
than appears on its face.
The South Carolina statute provides another example of ABA
coverage. To begin, it does not explicitly state that ABA must be cov-
ered. However, it does state that "[a] health insurance plan ... must
provide coverage for the treatment of autism spectrum disorder" and
limit coverage to "treatment that is prescribed by the insured's treat-
ing medical doctor in accordance with a treatment plan.' 0 7 The stat-
ute further provides a maximum benefit of $50,000 per year for
behavioral therapy for the treatment of autism.'08 Overall, two aspects
of this statute are notable. First, it requires coverage for seemingly
anything that the autistic child's doctor may prescribe; this coverage is
undoubtedly more expansive than the IDEA, which only requires edu-
101 Id. § 764h(a).
102 Id. § 764h(f)(12).
1o3 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
104 See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 764h (f)(12).
105 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1355.015 (Vernon 2009).
106 See id. § 1355.015(c) (2).
107 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-280(B) (Supp. 2009).
108 See id. § 38-71-280(E) (providing that the cap will be adjusted annually for
inflation).
1272 [Vol. 95:1253
AUTISM, INSURANCE, AMD THE IDEA
cationally beneficial services. Second, it provides a monetary ceiling
on the behavioral therapy that must be provided to an autistic child.
However, $50,000 per year is a comparatively large cap and would
cover the required therapy in almost all circumstances. 10 9 Thus, the
South Carolina statute likely offers coverage in excess of that which
the IDEA offers.
Having reviewed the state of the law, it is possible to draw a few
conclusions. First, the IDEA, as it exists, provides a path for at least
some autistic children to receive services such as ABA. However, this
pathway contains significant limitations. Furthermore, it is clear from
my previous exploration of the ideological underpinnings of the IDEA
that the understanding of what constitutes special education limits the
provision of services under this approach. Second, the state insurance
statutes may provide greater coverage than the IDEA in some circum-
stances. This discrepancy suggests that such statutes may be a useful
stopgap. Nevertheless, the problematic aspects of the medical con-
ception suggest that this route is not ideal. Below, I will consider what
might be a more suitable method of provision of services that, unlike
the current state of the law, integrates the neurodiversity conception.
III
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: INTEGRATING THE CONCEPTIONS
A. Whose Voices Are Heard? Whose Are Silenced?
I now come to the heart of this Note's critique of the three identi-
fied conceptions-examining how each conception privileges various
groups over others and how each values the voices of persons with
ASDs. By asking these questions, it is possible to then assess the ap-
propriateness and desirability of each conception from a disability le-
gal studies perspective and examine the relative shortcomings and
strengths of each conception. I will analyze each conception through
the lens of disability legal studies, a theoretical perspective that "inves-
tigates issues such as the social construction of disability, ableism[,]
and the power structure that supports and enhances the privileged
status and conditions of nondisabled persons in relation to disabled
persons, the genealogy of social categories such as normalcy, and the
politics of bodily variations."' 10
I will begin by examining the medical conception, which is per-
haps the simplest to understand in terms of privileging. It corre-
sponds closely with what the disability community has labeled the
109 See Womack, supra note 28 (explaining that the cost of educating autistic children
ranges from $12,000 to $20,000 per year).
110 Sagit Mor, Between Charity, Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis of
Privilege and Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy, 18 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 63, 64 (2006).
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medical model of disability. Deborah Kaplan explains the medical
model as follows:
Under this model, the problems that are associated with disability
are deemed to reside within the individual. In other words, if the
individual is "cured" then these problems will not exist. Society has
no underlying responsibility to make a "place" for persons with disa-
bilities, since they live in an outsider role waiting to be cured. 1 '
This articulation of the medical model of disability clarifies that it priv-
ileges the abled ("healthy") over the disabled ("sick"). The medical
conception of ASDs and ABA clearly applies the medical model of
disability. It posits that those with ASDs are sick and that ABA must
cure them. As such, it privileges being "neurotypical" over being
"neurodiverse." A disability legal studies conception rejects this pre-
mise and argues that "disability is socially constructed and not an in-
herent, objective, or fixed trait that resides within the disabled
person."112 From a disability legal studies perspective, the medical
conception fails because it assumes that the "problem" of ASDs can be
"fixed" by removing the disability, which proponents of the medical
conception understand as a sickness located within the autistic indi-
vidual. The medical conception thus "assumes that the individual is a
problem that should be fixed, adapted, rehabilitated, and 'main-
streamed' to fit social norms."113
Furthermore, the most prominent voices advocating the medical
conception are those of autism advocacy groups, many of which are
primarily comprised of parents or other relatives of autistic chil-
dren.114 This point raises questions regarding what role parents
should play in the autism community: Should parents' voices be heard
at all? If so, to what degree? The disabled community in general has
suffered from allowing disability to be constructed by others; as Kaplan
notes, this construction leads to a situation where conditions may be
considered "major social disabilities" even though "they cause little or
no functional or physical difficulty for the person who has them."115
Moreover, as Sinclair noted, parents of autistic children often suffer
severe grief.'1 6 This emotional investment suggests that parents of
children with ASDs may be ill equipped to fairly and functionally artic-
ulate a proper conception of ASDs and ABA. However, for individuals
11 Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community, 3 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 352, 353 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
112 Mor, supra note 110, at 69.
113 Id. at 70.
114 See Autism Speaks, Autism Speaks History, http://www.autismspeaks.org/
about.us.php (last visitedJtly 18, 2010) (noting that autism speaks was founded by the
grandparents of an autistic child); Solomon, supra note 5, at 108-09.
115 Kaplan, supra note 111, at 357.
116 Sinclair, supra note 6.
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with ASDs who are unable to communicate for themselves, who will
speak for them if not their parents, other close relatives, or friends?
As I will demonstrate, this particular criticism applies to all three of
the previously articulated conceptions and is perhaps the hardest to
address satisfactorily.
The medical conception relates closely to the state insurance laws
discussed above because they explicitly posit ABA as a medical treat-
ment for autism. For example, the South Carolina statute explicitly
states that to qualify for coverage, a medical doctor must order ABA
therapy. 1 17 Thus, the criticisms articulated for the medical concep-
tion apply with equal force to the state insurance laws. Nevertheless,
these laws do have a potential role in an acceptable model of under-
standing ASDs and ABA, which I explore below.
The educational conception, like the medical conception, falls
short from a disability legal studies perspective. Its failure is not as
egregious as the medical conception, though, because it can at least
arguably be understood as providing autistic individuals with the tools
they need to function in a particular society rather than as an attempt
to "cure" ASDs. This discussion, however, implicates a second model
of disability-the social model. The social model, which some disabil-
ity legal studies scholars embrace, explains that "the many daily activi-
ties and basic pleasures that people with disabilities cannot enjoy are
rooted not in their own limitations, but in the way society was de-
signed-by the nondisabled and for the nondisabled. And it is that
design that socially burdens people with disabilities-not their biologi-
cal impairments."' 1 8 In other words, it is precisely the problem that
people with ASDs are expected to conform to a society that does not
even contemplate their unique needs or desires. This problem obvi-
ously cannot be solved by providing them with the tools to adapt to a
hostile society that is unsuitable to their very way of being.
What can be made of the fact that the IDEA provides behavioral
therapy only to those autistic children whose educational achievement
it would aid? From a disability legal studies perspective, this provision
has both negative and positive aspects. It is positive because it at-
tempts to distinguish between disabilities that truly affect an individ-
ual's ability to function and those that do not. As disability legal
studies scholars have noted, an acceptable construction of disability
need not-and ought not-discount the actual impact that a disability
has on the disabled person's life. 119 However, a problem remains be-
cause the proffered solution to such disabilities remains therapy that
117 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-280(B) (Supp. 2009)
118 Mor, supra note 110, at 70. See generally CLAiRE H. LLACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SO-
CIAL CoNSTIucr: LEciSLATIVE ROOTS- (1988):
119 See Kaplan, supra note 111, at 355.
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will allow the individual to hew more closely to societal norms. Fur-
thermore, introducing this distinction may create an unfortunate
power dynamic: if only some autistic children are afforded access to
ABA, someone must decide who receives access and who does not.
Almost certainly, the decision maker will not be the autistic individual
or even that individual's parents.
The educational conception also silences the voices of the autistic
in other ways. First, some of the obvious beneficiaries of the educa-
tional conception are insurance companies, which would be relieved
of the burden of providing ABA. Insurance companies, as businesses
operating within a capitalist system, have few incentives to seek the
solutions that best benefit the affected individuals. Insurance compa-
nies do not even have the built-in incentive that parents and close
relatives have to seek the best interests of the autistic individual, how-
ever flawed that incentive may appear in practice.
Second, the educational conception itself may silence the autistic
individuals it seeks to help. For example, the IDEA provides that the
IEP team-those responsible for developing the child's individualized
education program-shall include the child's parents, teachers, a rep-
resentative of the local educational agency, and "whenever appropriate,
the child with a disability."120 One is left to wonder, when is it appro-
priate not to include a child in determining what would best serve his
or her needs? Perhaps more importantly, who decides whether or not
inclusion is "appropriate?" If the parents and the school district must
decide, the problem of silencing the voices of the disabled arises
again.
Finally, it is necessary to address the most serious failing of the
educational conception-the inability to articulate a disability-friendly
definition of education. The IDEA, which is the paradigmatic legisla-
tion for understanding the educational conception, regards education
as little more than a tool for functioning within the dominant, able-
bodied society. This goal of conformity is part of a larger problem
with the role of education and schools in American society. As H. Svi
Shapiro and David E. Purpel explain, the true
purposes of education can only be grasped if we view schools as cul-
tural and political sites that give legitimacy to the way social rela-
tions and cultural values are patterned in this society.
[P]owerful social and ideological interests seek to integrate schools
into the system of hierarchy, social differentiation, and commodi-
fled human relationships. 121
120 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1) (B) (vii) (2006) (emphasis added).
121 Part I: SocialJustice and Democracy: Unmet Promises, in CRITICAL SOCIAL ISSUES IN AMER-
ICAN EDUCATION: DEMOCRACY AND MEANING IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 1, 5 (H. Svi Shapiro &
David E. Purpel eds., 3d. ed. 2005).
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In a way, the educational conception is unacceptable because society
has an objectionable perception of education. In the final subpart of
this Note, I will explore what might constitute a more acceptable no-
tion of education.
The neurodiversity conception appears to solve some of the
problems perceived in the medical and educational conceptions.
First, the neurodiversity conception does not privilege nondisabled
over disabled persons. Neurodiversity proponents want society to ac-
cept autistic persons as they are rather than fighting to make them
"normal."'122 By arguing that it is not the responsibility of an autistic
person to conform to societal norms, neurodiversity proponents mir-
ror the arguments of the social model of disability. It is only because
society has labeled the characteristic behaviors of ASDs "abnormal"
that they are widely viewed as unacceptable. The problem, as
neurodiversity proponents see it, is with society, not the autistic.
The neurodiversity movement also clearly values the voices of the
autistic, giving them a space in which they can be heard. Indeed, one
of the neurodiversity movement's most trenchant criticisms of "main-
stream" autism advocacy groups is that they do not speak to the needs
of the autistic. As one neurodiversity advocate states, "The organiza-
tions with the best connections were founded by parents of people
with autism, who aren't going to have the same priorities as autistic
people, especially if those parents' idea of success is to make their kid
the same as themselves."'123 The neurodiversity conception, thus,
clearly gives a voice to those whom the medical and educational con-
ceptions silence.
The neurodiversity conception, however, is not without its own
problems. As discussed previously, autistic people without the ability
to communicate clearly cannot join the neurodiversity movement, no
matter how much the proponents of that movement would love for
them to speak. One mother of an autistic child articulated this prob-
lem to Solomon:
I'd like nothing more than for [my autistic daughter] to develop the
kind of consciousness that would allow her to join the neurodivers-
ity movement .... If she decides to communicate without speech,
that will be her choice, and I would love for her to be capable of
such choices. It's my fantasy that someday my daughter will go to
122 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Neurodiversity Forever: The Disability Movement Turns to Brains,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at WK1 ("[T]hose who deviate from the shrinking subset of
neurologically 'normal' want tolerance, not just of their diagnoses, but of their behavioral
quirks. They say brain differences, like body differences, should be embraced, and argue
for an acceptance of 'neurodiversity."').
123 Solomon, supra note 5, at 108.
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her therapist to say what a terrible mother I was forcing her to do all
this ABA. When that happens, I'll know I succeeded.
124
The ability to make meaningful decisions is not the only benefit
that may result from treatment with behavioral therapy. Children
with autism may engage in behaviors that are not just socially unac-
ceptable but also pose real physical threats, both to themselves and
others. 125 If ABA therapy can help to eliminate self-injurious behav-
iors, 12 6 is it fair to deny that to autistic individuals who, if they could
communicate, might express a desire not to engage in those behav-
iors? It is notable, though, that Solomon interviewed at least one au-
tistic individual who was more interested in a cure than in acceptance:
Jonathan Mitchell, an autistic who blogs against neurodiversity, says,
"Most persons with an autism-spectrum disorder have never ex-
pressed their opinions on someone's blog and never will. The
neurodiverse often reach a vulnerable audience, as many persons
on the spectrum have low self-esteem. Neurodiversity provides a
tempting escape valve."'
27
Are the voices of people like Jonathan, or those who lack his ability to
speak against neurodiversity, less valuable than those who speak for it?
There are downsides, then, with each of the three identified con-
ceptions. Looking at these shortcomings, it becomes clear that a sig-
nificant number are based on the fallacious concept of "autistic
people" as a monolithic group and the general failure to fully appreci-
ate the reason for the terminology "autism spectrum disorders." The
medical conception fails to account for autistic individuals whose per-
ceived shortcomings do not act as a burden. Despite the fact that
many autistics lead happy, fulfilling lives with families and successful
careers, the medical conception categorizes them as "sick" and tells
them that they must be "cured." This treatment is an insult to human
dignity and further illustrates why it is problematic to impose tradi-
tional measures of happiness and success onto individuals who may
have completely different measures of such attributes.
The educational conception also fails to account for particular
individuals with ASDs in two ways. First, if one accepts the notion that
for certain individuals with autism, ABA may be useful in eliminating
124 Id.
125 See Autism Fact Sheet, supra note 19 ("Many children with [autism] engage in re-
petitive movements such as rocking and twirling, or in self-abusive behavior such as biting
or head-banging."). This is not a suggestion that autistic people are prone to violence
towards others, which is a common stereotype employed against the autistic. It is merely
an acknowledgement that an autistic person might, while engaging in self-injurious behav-
iors, inadvertently injure another person.
126 See Solomon, supra note 5, at 108 (noting that since beginning ABA therapy, one
child "no longer engages in self-injurious behavior and has few tantrums").
127 Id.
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self-injurious or otherwise truly objectionable behaviors, the educa-
tional conception alone cannot suffice. This conception is insuffi-
cient because, as the name suggests, it is concerned with educational
benefits, which may not be what an autistic individual really needs (es-
pecially considering the narrow and somewhat suspect view of educa-
tion that the federal regulations promote). The educational
conception fails from the other side as well because it ignores the
voices of the autistic in conceiving of appropriate educational bene-
fits. One could argue, however, that the IDEA makes an effort to in-
clude these voices by stipulating that the disabled child could possibly
be part of the IEP team.
B. The Disability Legal Studies Conception
As I have discussed, significant limitations are inherent in each of
the medical, educational, and neurodiversity conceptions; one signifi-
cant problem is that each conception silences the voices of some
members of the autistic population. Any solution, then, must account
for the fact that autism is a spectrum, and the needs of the various
people on that spectrum will vary dramatically. The educational con-
ception may provide the best starting point to articulate a disability
legal studies conception of ASDs and ABA. Although the medical and
neurodiversity conceptions are, in many ways, fundamentally incom-
patible, a conception rooted in the educational conception could ap-
propriately bridge the gap between them.
A disability legal studies conception must be built on two key
principles. First, it must be understood that disability is a social con-
struct, created by a society not attuned to the needs of the disabled.
Second, one must be careful not to erase the real "pain, suffering,
dependency, and other bodily and functional limitations that impair-
ments entail, or ... the multifaceted relations between impairment
and disability, and between the social and the biological experiences
of impairment/disability. '" 128 It is necessary to keep these critical in-
sights in mind as we try to envision a viable and respectful relationship
between the autistic population and ABA therapy.
The educational conception's strength lies in its recognition of
the fact that not all people with autism require the same therapy (if
any at all). Both the medical and the neurodiversity conceptions fal-
ter in this regard-the former because it perceives behavioral therapy
as appropriate for all individuals with autism and the latter because it
perceives behavioral therapy as appropriate for no one. Even so, the
biggest failure of the educational conception lies in its understanding
of education as simply an application of the unfortunate notion that
128 Mor, supra note 110, at 71.
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the primary purpose of schools is indoctrination into the dominant
societal structure. As Jane Roland Martin states, a person who receives
such an education "will be provided with knowledge about others[ ]
but will not be taught to care about their welfare or act kindly toward
them. That person will be given some understanding of society[ ] but
will not be taught to feel its injustices or even to be concerned over its
fate."1 29 A disability legal studies conception based on the educa-
tional model must first explicate a more responsible understanding of
education.
One alternate form of education is known as multicultural educa-
tion. Christine E. Sleeter and Carl Grant describe multicultural edu-
cation as an approach that "links race, language, culture, gender,
disability, and, to a lesser extent, social class, working toward making
the entire school celebrate human diversity and equal opportu-
nity.'113 0 Sleeter and Grant provide little description of how such an
educational approach would be implemented; however, they do men-
tion that "many special educators . . .argue that disabled students'
differences should be accepted and built on."13' In the context of
autism and ABA, then, the relevant inquiry is whether ABA can be a
part of accepting and building on the differences that autistic students
exhibit. This task is difficult without delving into the mechanics of
autism, which is outside the scope of this Note; however, we can set
forth a basic paradigm.
In sum, an education-based disability legal studies conception of
the relationship between autistic individuals would resemble the fol-
lowing: an individualized evaluation would be made to determine the
ways in which autism was negatively impacting the life and abilities of
the autistic child. This evaluation would involve significant and deci-
sive input from the autistic child. If the autistic child is unable to
communicate, his or her relatives, friends, and teachers should be in-
volved in the evaluation; each participant should focus on the needs
of the autistic child and not his or her own personal preferences. The
members of the evaluation team should be familiar with the argu-
ments of the neurodiversity movement and should consider how best
to amplify the autistic child's inherent abilities.
After the evaluation team has determined what aspects of the au-
tistic child's disability truly impact his or her quality of life negatively,,
the team should ask whether ABA is an appropriate therapy for miti-
129 Jane Roland Martin, Becoming Educated: A Journey of Alienation or Integration?, in CRIT-
ICAL SOCIAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: DEMOCRACY AND MEANING IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD, supra note 121, at 197, 199.
130 Christine E. Sleeter & Carl Grant, Illusions of Progress: Business as Usual, in CRITICAL
SOCIAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: DEMOCRACY AND MEANING IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD,
supra note 121, at 89, 104.
131 Id. at 103.
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gating those negative impacts. For example, if self-injurious behaviors
are a concern, ABA might be appropriate. The autistic child should
have as much input as possible in developing the therapeutic program
and choosing the instructors. These instructors should be trained to
build on the autistic child's strengths and to refrain from forcing the
child to conform to social norms that do not benefit that particular
child.
Finally, there should be periodic evaluations to determine
whether the therapy is still necessary or helpful. This step is critical
because it should prevent inappropriate uses of the therapy, such as
imposition of unnecessary or unsuitable social conventions. As with
all steps of the therapy process, the input of the autistic child should
be the focus of this inquiry: does the child feel that the therapy is
helping him or her to live more easily?
Insurance statutes that autism advocacy groups promote are po-
tentially problematic within this new scheme because insurance is per-
haps inextricably linked to the medical conception. Nevertheless,
these statutes could be a useful stopgap measure when local schools
are unable to bear the entire cost of therapy. As illustrated above,
cases exist in which, because of the narrow understanding given to
"education," children who might benefit from ABA are not given ac-
cess to it; the state insurance statutes might also be useful in these
situations. Eventually and ideally, however, such laws would become
unnecessary as the understanding of education broadens and the best
interests of the autistic child control the decision-making process.
This new conception would perhaps be expensive but likely no
more so than the existing methods used under the IDEA. The biggest
change from the status quo would be a shift in focus of the various
inquiries, which would change from a society-based focus (can this
child function in the dominant society?) to a child-based focus (is this
child being helped to live in a way that is functional for him or her?).
By changing the focus, the process can be retooled to introduce ele-
ments of human dignity and avoid imposing therapy on those who
neither want nor need it.
CONCLUSION
Having identified three conceptions of autism and ABA (the
medical conception, the educational conception, and the neurodiver-
sity conception), this Note examined the shortcomings of each from
the perspective of disability legal studies. Each conception failed in a
variety of ways, but the overarching problem was that each conception
silenced the voices of at least some members of the autistic commu-
nity. On this front, the neurodiversity conception silenced the fewest
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voices, but it ultimately failed because it ignored the voices of autistics
who did not share its underlying goals.
I then articulated a new conception, which in many ways com-
bines the educational and neurodiversity conceptions. This new con-
ception starts from the disability legal studies notion that it is not the
responsibility of a disabled person to conform him or herself to the
dictates of a society that is hostile to his or her way of being. However,
this understanding does not mean that we must pretend that a disabil-
ity never negatively impacts a person's life or that accommodations
are never necessary or helpful. Proceeding from this starting point, I
articulated a conception that focuses, whenever possible, on the ac-
tual, expressed needs of the autistic individual. Where the autistic in-
dividual cannot provide meaningful input, necessity compels us to rely
on the input of others. However, to make sure that this input is as
valuable as possible, the other person's interactions with and
knowledge of the autistic individual, as well as his or her understand-
ing of the neurodiversity conception, should inform his or her input.
By integrating these two perspectives, we are able to envision a legal
framework that best serves the needs of the autistic individual and his
or her community.
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